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Abstract 
There are several well-known counter-examples to the Binding Theory of Chomsky 
(1981, 1993) which have to do with Principles (B) and (C). These counter-examples have 
different degrees of acceptability. We can account for these counter-examples and 
explain their different degrees of acceptability by (i) Distinguishing different types of 
sentences among these examples; different kinds of sentences exemplify different 
phenomena and require different explanations. (ii) Viewing Binding Theory as a 
semantic theory about how to semantically interpret certain structural relationships 
between NPs. (iii) Modifying principies (B) and (C) so that they are not about the 
relation of having the same value, but rather about the relation of it being presupposed 
to have the same value in a given context. (iv) Identifying how the Binding Principles 
interact with other sources of semantic information in order to yield the interpretation 
for a sentence. These other semantic factors rnight provide information that conf¡icts with 
(B) or (C). The data show that when these other semantic factors determine some 
interpretation for a sentence in a clear enough way the speakers judge such an inter- 
pretation as at least partially acceptable. 
Key words: formal semantics, binding theory, semantic interpretation. 
Resum. Teoria del Lligam, interpretació semdntica i context 
Hi ha tota una sbrie de coneguts contraexemples a la Teoria del Lligam de Chomsky 
(1981,1993) que tenen a veure amb els principis (B) i (C). Aquests contraexemples 
posseeixen diferents graus d'acceptabilitat. Podem explicar aquests exemples i explicar 
a més per qui: unes frases són jutjades més acceptables gramaticalment que altres si fem 
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Pi, Gemma Rigau, Joana Rosselló Asensi, Robert Stalnaker and an anonymous CWPL reviewer for 
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el següent: (i) Distingir diferents tipus de frases dintre d'aquests exemples; diferents 
frases exemplifiquen diferents fenbmens i requereixen diferents explicacions. (ii) 
Considerar la Teoria del Lligam com una teoria semintica sobre com interpretar semin- 
ticament determinades relacions estructurals entre SNs. (iii) Modificar els principis 
(B) i (C) de forma que no tractin sobre la relació x té el mateix valor que y, sinó sobre 
la relació es pressuposa (respecte a cert context) que x i y tenen el mateix valor. (iv) 
Identificar com els principis de la Teoria del Lligam interaccionen amb altres fonts 
d'informació semantica a fi de produir la interpretació d'una oració. Aquests altres 
factors semintics poden proporcionar informació que estigui en conflicte amb (B) o (C). 
Les dades mostren que quan aquests altres factors semintics determinen una interpre- 
tació per a una oració de forma suficientment clara els parlants consideren aquesta 
interpretació com a, si més no, parcialment acceptable. 
Paraules clau: semintica formal, teoria del lligam, interpretació semintica. 
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1. Standard Binding Theory 
1 . l .  Principles (B)  and (C) 
Consider the following examples, where two NPs in a sentence have the same 
index if and only if either they both refer to the sarne individual or one of them is 
a quantificational NP (like, e.g, Every boy, or Somebody) and the other is bound to 
it (in the same sense that a logical variable is bound to a quantifier): 
(1) a. Kathrini saw herj 
b. *Kathrini saw heri 
c. Shei saw heri father 
d. Danieli says that hei is tired 
e. Danieli says that hej is tired 
f. He, says that Jasonj is, tired 
g. *Hei says that Jasoni is tired 
h. His, father says that Jason, is tired 
i. "(His father)i says that Richardi is tired 
j. (His father)i says that hei is tired 
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k. Hei saw Robertj 
1. *Hei saw Roberti 
m. His, mother saw Robert, 
n. *Everybodyi saw himi 
o. Everybodyi saw himj 
p. Every thief, fears that he, gets caught 
k. In Scarsdale, every single boyils mother sends the twerpi off to 
summer camp 
r. *In Scarsdale, every boy, thought the twerp, would hate summer camp 
We can explain all these data by appealing to conditions such as Chomsky's 
Principles (B) and (C) of the Binding  heo or^' below (we will not go here, though, 
into the detail of discussing how each sentence above is accounted for by those prin- 
ciples): 
Principle (B): Pronominals must be A-free in their Governing Category. 
Principle (C): R-expressions must be A-free. 
A succinct explanation of the terminology involved in the formulation of 
Principles (B) and (C): The class of Pronominals includes the non-reflexive 
pronouns (both possessive and non-possessive); R-expressions include proper 
names, epithets, definite descriptions, quantificational NPs, and traces of wh- 
movement and Quantifier Raising. Node X binds node Y if they are co-indexed 
and X c-commands Y. To be A-free is not to be bound by anything in an A-posi- 
tion (complement and subject positions are A-positions, adjoined positions and 
the specifier of CP are non A-positions). For the purposes of the present discussion 
we can set aside some difficulties arising when trying to specify the notion of 
Governing Category, and we can take the Governing Category (GC) of a node X 
to be the smallest maximal projection containing both a subject and a lexical cate- 
gory that governs X -or, more simply: the smallest NP or S that contains X. 
Different sets of conditions can be formulated that, even if they are not equi- 
valent to (B) and (C), are similar to them and are intended to account for the same 
kind of phenomena. We will call Disjointness Conditions any such set of conditions. 
We will call Standard Binding Theory the theory we are presenting in this section 
and which includes Principles (B) and (C). 
1.2. Some Comments 
Notice that we are not using indexes simply as part of some provisional notational 
convention to help us indicate what the reading of a sentence that we want to 
consider is. Rather, in the way we are using them, indexes are an essential part of 
the syntactic representation of a sentence (in the same way that each node in a 
tree is part of that representation). This is so because the Binding Principles are 
1. In, for instance, Chomsky (1981:188). 
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formulated in terms of the relation of binding, which, in turn, appeals to the rela- 
tion of snmeness of indexes. 
Also notice that in order to account for the data in (1) we need to appeal not only 
to the Binding Principles but also to a principle such as {{Referential NPs with 
the same index must refer to the same individual, referential NPs with different 
indexes must refer to different individuals; a NP is interpreted as bound by a quan- 
tificational NP if and only if they have the same index,,. We mentioned this prin- 
ciple above as in passing, but notice that it is crucial. Without it, Binding Theory 
would not explain, for instance, why (2a) is unacceptable if Begonya is core- 
ferential with her: Even if the syntactic representation (2b)2 is ruled out by Principle 
(B), (2c) is not. If it were possible for two NPs with different indexes to have the 
same referent, then (2c) could give rise to an interpretation that (2a) does not have. 
(2) a. Begonya likes her 
b. Begonyai likes heri 
c. Begonya, likes herj 
Thls discussion shows also another point: a theory that tries to explain why (2a) 
cannot have a coreferential reading has to include, some way or other, a semantic 
component. The explanation can not be given in purely syntactic terms. It rnight be, 
as it is the case with Standard Binding Theory, that the bulk of the explanation is 
carried out by purely syntactic principles, and that the semantic component 
is straightforward. Still the semantic part, even if straightforward, is essential to 
explain what we want to explain. 
It is possible to have a theory where the bulk of the explanation is at the 
semantic level. We can, for instance, formulate disjointness conditions which are 
completely analogous to Standard Binding Theory principles (B) and (C) but that 
operate at the semantic level (that is, they are conditions that directly constrain 
which interpretations are possible for a given LF-syntactic structure). Chomsky 
(1993) offers one set of such a semantic kind of disjointness c~nditions.~ Principles 
(B) and (C) are formulated there, roughly, in the following way: 
(B): If a is a pronominal, interpret it as distinct in reference from every 
c- commanding phrase in its GC. 
(C): If a is an r-expression, interpret it as distinct in reference from every 
c- commanding phrase. 
(In order to account for cases like (1n)-(lr) where there is no co-reference involved, 
these principles should, of course, be modified -or at least the term ccdistinct 
reference,, should be re-defined in such a way that it also applies to a relation 
2. (2b) should be regarded as a partia1 specification of a tree. We do not explicitly specify the whole 
tree for simplicity of exposition. Analogously for (2c). 
3. There are several examples of earlier semantic formulations of disjointness conditions, which 
include the non-coreference rule of Reinhart (1983), and the Rule of Interpretation of Chomsky 
(1973). 
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such as the one between Everybody and hirn in (ln). With such a modification in 
place, this theory makes the same predictions as Standard Binding Theory with 
respect to what interpretations the different sentences can have). 
2. Counter-examples to Standard Binding Theory Principles (B) and (C) 
It has been observed in the literature that there are severa1 different kinds of 
sentences that are counter-examples to the Standard Binding Theory Principles 
(B) and (C). In (3) we have some examples of sentences that pose a problem for 
principle (C):4 
(3) a. Who is that woman over there? She is professor Rigau. 
b. Everyone has finally realized that Oscar is incompetent. Even he has 
finally realized that Oscar is incompetent. 
c. Mary, Betty and John have one thing in common: Mary admires John, 
Betty admires John, and he himselfalso admires John. 
d. What do you mean Oscar loves no one? He loves Oscar. 
e. The logic tutor while trying to explain the law of Universal Instantiation 
to a student tells him: Look fathead. If everyone loves Oscar, then certainly 
he himselfmust love Oscar. 
f. I think that woman talking on TV is Zelda. She says the sarne things that 
Zelda says in her book. 
Each of these sentences can be interpreted so that the two italicized NPs have the 
same referent. If they are interpreted as having the same referent, then the two 
NPs must have the same index in the syntactic structure of the sentence. In each of 
these sentences, though, one NP c-commands the other, and, furthermore, the 
c-commanded NP is an R-expression. The syntactic structure, so, is undesirably 
ruled out by Principle (C) of the Standard Binding Theory. 
Analogously, the sentences in (4) pose a problem for the Principle (B) of the 
Standard Binding Theory 
(4) a. Mary, Betty and John have one thing in common: Mary admires John, 
Betty admires him, and John himselfalso admires hirn. 
b. At a Halloween party someone says: I think that the man with the devil 
costume is Joe. It is suspicious that he knows him so well. 
c. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? Oscar loves hirn. 
d. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? He loves hirn. 
Some of these sentences (like (3a) or (4b)) are one hundred per cent acceptable, 
others are not perfect but are good enough as to pose a problem for a theory accor- 
ding to which they are simply ruled out. 
4. Even if I do not specify the source of each of these sentences, most of them are adapted or directly 
taken from the references mentioned at the end; the same is true of the sentences in (4). 
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Heim (1993) offers some examples involving quantification which she claims 
are marginally acceptable and, to the extent that they are acceptable, also pose a 
problem for Principle (B), as for instance 
(5) a. The logic tutor while trying to explain the law of Universal Instantiation 
tells his student: Look, if everyone loves Oscar then it surely follows that 
Oscar himself must love Oscar. And, of course, this doesn't just hold for 
Oscar, but for any arbitrary man: if everyone loves a man, then that man 
himself loves him. 
b. Somebody said that what he had in common with his siblings was that 
his sister admired him, his brother admired him, and he himself also 
admired him. 
3. An alternative proposa1 
3.1. Other Proposals 
There are severa1 ways in which we could try to dea1 with these problematic exam- 
ples: One possibility would be to claim that the disjointness conditions should not 
be constraints on the relation of 'co-indexation' or of 'co-reference' but rather 
they should constrain some other relation, and that when this is done the disjoint- 
ness conditions will allow just those interpretations that the sentences can actually 
have. This is the approach taken in Higginbotham (1992). Of course the difficult 
task when opting for this view is to specify a suitable relation in terms of which we 
can formulate the disjointness conditions. Higginbotham introduces the relation of 
common reference, and formulates the disjointness conditions in terms of it. This 
relation is defined in terms of the intentions of the speaker. 
Another possible approach is to accept principles (B) and (C) as they are in 
Standard Binding Theory, but to modify the semantic part of the theory. Recall that 
the principle on the interpretation of indexes requires that two NPs get assigned the 
same individual if and only if they have the same index (and it also constrains 
how to interpret those NPs that will have an interpretation analogous to bound 
variables). One possible modification to the principle is to require only that if two 
NPs have the same index then they get assigned the same individual, but allo- 
wing that NPs with different indexes might also get assigned the same individual. 
Fiengo & May (1994) takes this kind of approach. The difficult part for this 
approach is not to explain, for instance, why (3b) can have a co-referential inter- 
pretation, but rather why (2a) can not usually have it. Fiengo & May (1994) tries 
to solve this by appealing to pragmatic principles. 
Another possibility is to think that in addition to disjointness conditions, we 
should also have some other principle which will allow us to make the desired 
distinction between, on the one hand, sentences like the ones in (3)-(4) and, on the 
other hand, sentences which are bad and should be ruled out. This is, very roughly, 
the line followed both by Tanya Reinhart (in, for instance, Reinhart (1983a,b) and 
Grodzinsky & Reinhart (1993)) and by Irene Heim (in Heim (1993)). The main 
difference between the two is this: Reinhart distinguishes, among the cases to 
which Standard Binding Theory applies, between the cases where there is binding 
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and cases where there is merely co-reference, and proposes that the disjointness 
conditions should only constrain cases involving binding, whereas cases invol- 
ving co-reference should be accounted for by another sort of principle (her Co- 
reference Rule), which is l e s ~  restrictive than principles (B) and (C) of the Standard 
Bindng Theory. Heim, on the other hand, proposes that the disjointness conditions 
apply to both the cases involving binding and the cases involving co-reference; the 
cases involving co-reference, though, will be in addition subject to another prin- 
ciple (her Co-determination Kule), which can redeem some sentences that the 
binding principles would rule out. 
I think that none of these proposals is entirely satisfactory, though each one 
provides valuable insight into the phenomena. I will not comment on these or 
other theories here, though. I would rather like to propose here another way of 
looking at the phenomena we have been discussing. Of course, a complete defense 
of the proposa1 I will put forward would require a careful discussion of the alter- 
natives. I intent to present such a discussion elsewhere. 
3.2. Overview 
An adequate theory should not only account for the contrast between the sentences 
which are not acceptable and those which are at least partially acceptable but it 
should also give an account of why the sentences in (3)-(5) have different degrees 
of acceptability, and specially, it should account for the difference between fully 
grammatical sentences like (3a), (3f) or (4b) and sentences which are regarded as 
grammatically awkward and only partially acceptable -like, for instance, (3c) or (4d). 
The proposa1 defended here does not consist in trying to find a set of disjoint- 
ness conditions with which none of the sentences in (3)-(5) is in conflict, but 
rather the disjointness conditions will be part of a more general account of what 
makes us regard some sentence (with some specific interpretation) as acceptable. 
This general account will explain why these sentences are acceptable even if some 
of them will be in conflict with the disjointness conditions we will provide. 
In the present proposa1 I attempt to explore the idea in Chomsky (1993) of 
regarding the disjointness conditions as semantic principles about how to interpret 
the NPs in a ~ e n t e n c e . ~  
In surnmary, the present proposa1 is the following: The sentences that are fully 
acceptable can be divided in two groups: identity sentences, and non-identity 
sentences. I formulate in section 3.3. the disjointness conditions (in semantic 
terms) so that they do not constrain the relation of co-reference but rather the rela- 
tion of presupposed co-reference6 -in this I follow Postal (1970) and Heim 
(1993). These disjointness conditions are then no longer in conflict with fully 
acceptable non-identity sentences like (3f) or (4d) (section 5.1.). On the other 
hand, I argue in section 5.2 that identity sentences like (the second clause of) (3a) 
5.  All the main ideas put forward in the following pages, though, could be incorporated, with some 
adjustments, into an account using a 'syntactic version' of the disjointness conditions. 
6. Actually, once we take also into consideration quantificational NPs, the relation being constrained 
is that of presupposed co-valueness. These notions are explained in the next section (section 3.3). 
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are not constrained by the disjointness conditions, since one of the NPs is not an 
argument but a predicate. 
One of the main contentions of this article is about what explains the (partial) 
acceptability of sentences like (3c): when interpreting an utterance of a sentence like 
(3c) the speakers use severa1 sources of information, the disjointness conditions 
being just one of them. If the other sources determine an interpretation for the 
NPs in a clear enough way, the sentence will be able to be understood in accordance 
with that interpretation even if it conflicts with the information provided by the 
disjointness conditions. The existence of this conflict will explain that the sentences 
are not regarded as completely good (sections 4 and 6). 
Finally, in section 7 I argue that we must distinguish two different levels in the 
interpretation of a sentence: one where only the lexical items and the gramma- 
tical structure of the sentence is taken into account, and a second level where 
contextual information is introduced so as to produce the full interpretation of the 
sentence. 
3.3. Disjointness Conditions 
In this section I propose a different formulation of the disjointness conditions. 
First I state the principles, then I explain the notions involved in their formulation. 
I think that we should understand the disjointness conditions in the following 
way (I will refer to (B)' and (C)' below as the Disjointness Conditions): 
( B  : If a sentence whose LF representation is . . . a.. .D.. . (where P is a prono- 
minal, and a is an NP that c-cornmands /3 in its GC) is used in a context 
C, it is not presupposed in C that a and P are co-valued. 
(C): If a sentence whose LF  representation is . . .a.. ./3... (where P is an 
R- expression, and a is an NP that c-commands P) is used in a context 
C, it is not presupposed in C that a and P are co-valued. 
Let's explain what we mean by the notions of 'being presupposed', 'context' and 
'being covalued' that we use in stating the Disjointness Conditions. 
'being covalued with': NPs can have different sorts of semantic value. Corres- 
ponding to these different sorts of semantic value, there are different possible rela- 
tions among NPs in a sentence. 
If two NPs refer to the same individual, we would say that they are on the 
relation of common reference. If two NPs are in the same relation that his and 
Every boy are in (6) when we understand the sentence so that every boy loves his 
own mother -where one NP acts like a variable bound by another NP-, we 
would say that the latter links7 the former. 
(6) Every boy loves his mother. 
7. I borrow the tems  alinking, and ucommon reference, from Higginbotham (1983,1992). My use 
of them is not exactly his. 
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Our characterization of the distinction between the two sorts of relation is 
quite uncommitted, but it suffices for the present purposes of defining the relation 
of 'being covalued', since, as we will presently see, the two former relations get 
combined in the definition of the latter.* 
We define 'to be covalued with' as the transitive closure of the relation 'to 
link, to be linked to, or to be in common reference ~ i t h ' . ~  That is, NP a is co-valued 
with NP ,6 iff a belongs to any set s which is such that: 
(I) ,8 belongs to s and 
(11) if x belongs to s then any y such that x links y or y links x 
or x is in common reference with y also belongs to s. 
So, for instance, if in (7) we were to interpret both he and him as linked to 
Every boy, then he and him would be co-valued (even though the two pronouns are 
not themselves in a linking relation or in a common reference relation), and so 
such an interpretation would violate the Disjointness Conditions: 
(7) Every boy thinks that he loves him. 
'Presupposition' and 'context': The notions of 'presupposition' and 'context' that 
we use in stating our disjointness conditions are the same as in Stalnaker 
(1973,1974): linguistic communication always takes place on the basis of a back- 
ground of common beliefs and assumptions, or context. Using the possible worlds 
framework we can identify a context in which some instance of linguistic commu- 
nication takes place with a set of possible worlds: those worlds that as far as the 
participants in the conversation can tell could be the actual world. The context 
set consists of those worlds that could be the actual world according to what the 
participants in the conversation believe, and believe that the others believe, and 
believe that the others believe that they believe and so on. (If we wanted to make 
this characterization more precise we should take into consideration that what is rele- 
vant is not only what the participants believe but also what they pretend to believe). 
A proposition p is presupposed in a context C if p is true in each world in C. A 
sentence s carries the presupposition that p if it would be infelicitous to assert s in 
any context where it is not presupposed that p. 
The individual that a referential NP picks up at a world in the context w, is the 
individual that the NP would refer to if w were the actual world. A sentence is true 
in a world in the context w, if the sentence would be true if w were the actual world. 
Let's consider one example. Suppose I utter the sentence He is un artist while 
pointing to a man who is in front of us. Since all the participants in the conversa- 
8. For our present purposes, for instance, we do not need to characterize the two relations in a way 
which is precise enough as to decide whether in (i) (when it is interpreted as meaning that Albert 
loves his own brother) Albert and his are in common reference, one links the other, or the sentence 
is ambiguous with respect to which of the two sort of relations holds 
(i) Albert loves his brother 
9. This notion of 'co-valueness' is a very close relative of the notion of xcodeterminationx in Heim 
(1993). 
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tion will believe (and believe that the others believe, etc.) that the man is in front 
. of us and that I uttered He while pointing at him, it will be part of the context that 
the rnan is in front of us and that he is the one I am referring to by He. That is, for 
each world in the context w He will pick up that rnan in w. Let's suppose further that 
we are unsure whether the rnan is Jirn Harris. That means that there will be some 
worlds in the context where the rnan in front of us is Jirn Harris, but there will 
also be some worlds in the context where Jim Harris is someone other than the rnan 
in front of us.1° He will pick up Jim Harris in those worlds where Harris is the rnan 
in front of us, but will not pick up Jim Harris in those worlds where Jim Harris is 
someone else. This agrees with the intuitive idea that, if we do not know whether 
the rnan is or not Jim Harris, then we are unsure as well as to whether He refers to 
Jim Harris or to someone else. 
We are finally in the position to understand the central notion in our formula- 
tion of the disjointness conditions: Two NPs are presupposed to be co-valued if they 
are co-valued in each possible world in the context. So if a and /3 are referential NPs 
then it is not presupposed that a and P are co-valued if there is at least one world 
w in the context set such that: the individual that a picks up in w is not the same 
as the individual /3 picks up in w (i.e., if w were the actual world then a and /3 
would not refer to the same individual). If a NP a is understood as linked by 
another NP /3, this fact is not dependent on the context in the way that the specific 
value of a referential NP depends on the context, and a will be linked to /3 in each 
world in the context, and so it will be presuposed that they are co-valued. So, if two 
NPs are not presupposed to be co-valued, then it cannot be that they are inter- 
preted so that one of them links the other. 
To end section 3, let's point out that the disjointness conditions formulated in 
this section incorporate three kinds of ideas: First, the Disjointness Conditions 
are semantic principles that specify what the semantic significance of certain struc- 
tural relations among NPs is. They are not syntactic principles that rule out certain 
syntactic representations. Second, the relation the Disjointness Conditions are 
about is the relation of presupposed co-valueness (as opposed to the relation of 
actually being co-valued).ll Third, the principles apply both to sentences contai- 
ning quantificational NPs, and to sentences containing only referential NPs. 
10 If I were to utter He is Jirn Harris, then this sentence would express the necessary m e  proposition 
in those worlds where the rnan is Jirn Harris and the necessary false proposition in those worlds 
where Jirn Harris is someone else. Not knowing which worlds in the context agree with how the 
actual world is, we would not know whether the utterance was necessarily true or necessarily 
false. Still the utterance would be informative since it would indicate to anyone who accepted it, 
that those worlds where the rnan is not Jirn Harris (and where the utterance expresses the neces- 
sarily false proposition) are not compatible with what we take to be the case, and so should no longer 
be regarded as part of the context. This picture helps clarify how it is possible that an utterance 
expresses a necessary proposition but it is nevertheless informative. For a more detailed explanation 
see Stalnaker (1979). 
11. I take the idea of appealing to what it is presupposed rather than to what is actually the case in trying 
to dea1 with the phenomena related to the disjointness conditions from Heim (1982,1993). Heim, 
in tum, credits Postal (1970) for this idea. The main difference between Heim's formulation of the 
disjointness conditions and rnine is that she states her Binding Principies as purely syntactic prin- 
ciples that rule out certain co-indexations among NPs. 
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4. The Disjointness Conditions and Other Sources of Semantic Information 
In this section I explain what I think accounts for the acceptability of sentences like 
(3b) or (4a) which are somewhat awkward but which are good enough as to pose 
a problem to Standard Binding Theory. The explanation in this section will make 
no essential use of the fact that we have formulated the Disjointness Conditions in 
tems of the relation of presupposed co-valueness. The importance of so formulating 
the Disjoiness Conditions will become apparent in the next section (section 5 )  
when we discuss those sentences that, like (3f) and (4b) are completely good. 
We will introduce the idea we want to put forward in this section by means of 
an analogy. 
First, though, a comment regarding the numbers between square brackets that 
will appear after some of the sentences from this point on: they are the mean grade 
that the sentence obtained on a 0-7 scale according to the grammaticality judg- 
ments provided by a number of speakers.12 We will make use of these dada at 
several points in this paper. Even though the specific mean grade for a certain 
sentence is not in itself very significant (different speakers may, for instance, have 
used different criteria regarding how good a sentence should be in order to be 
given, say, a 5) ,  the relative grade of a sentence with respect to other sentences is, 
I think, very significant. I think that it is very difficult to use reliable data on the rela- 
tive acceptability of different sentences without having recourse to some metho- 
dology of the kind I have used.13 
4.1. Analogy 
I think it would help to explain what the present proposa1 is if we consider an - - 
analogy. Imagine that an English speaker is asked to determine whether the 
sentences in (8) below are acceptable, and that she is told that an index m is meant 
to indicate that we are considering a reading of the sentence where the expres- 
sion with the subindex m refers to some individual who is a male.14 
(8) a. She, is wearing a nice dress 
b. I didn't mean to hurt her, 
The speaker would say that, given that subindexation, (8a,b) are unacceptable 
since these sentences cannot be used with she or her referring to a man. 
12. I submitted two questionnaires to 11 English speakers, asking for their linguistic judgements on a 
total of 36 sentences. The speakers were asked to give a grade to each sentence according to how 
good or acceptable they felt the sentence to be; 7 being the grade for a perfectly good sentence, and 
O the grade for a completely unacceptable one. They were aslced to evaluate the sentence without 
thinking of any special context where the sentence might be uttered, unless such an special or 
uncommon context was explicitly provided in the questlonnaire. 
13. For a very interesting discussion and criticism of the methodology employed in linguistics see 
Schutze (1995). 
14. Notice that here, unlike what was the case in previous examples, the index is not part of the 
syntactic representation of the sentence, but just a device to indicate to the person giving linguistic 
judgments what is the interpretation we want her to consider. 
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If we place the sentence in an appropriate context, through, the speaker might 
say that the sentences are, at least, partially acceptable. For instance, if we postu- 
late that the sentence (8a) is uttered in a situation in which a male friend has put on 
a woman's dress: even if all the people involved in the conversation are well aware 
that the speaker is talking about a man, the use of she to refer to him is accep- 
table. Similarly for (8b): if a rather male chauvinistic speaker wants to suggest 
that some man who was offended by the speaker and is crying is too sensitive, 
he might use (8b) where her will be understood by all the participants to refer to 
the man who is crying. In (8a,b) the use of She and her canies the information that 
the speaker is referring to a (human) female. This information, though, might be 
neutralized by some extra information provided by the context in which the sentence 
is uttered. 
What I want to suggest is that some of the examples involving violations of 
Principies (B) and (C) are, in part, similar to those above involving the use of She 
and her above: An English speaker is asked to evaluate some sentence with certain 
intended pattern of coreference, like, for instance, Oscar loves him with Oscar 
being co-referential with him. The sentence is declared as unacceptable since the 
arrangement of the NPs carries the information that they cannot be assumed to 
corefer, that is, carries some information that contradicts what we have stipulated 
is the intended interpretation we are considering. If we place the sentence in a 
suitable context, though, for instance in (4c) [What do you mean no one loves 
Oscar? Oscar loves him], the information provided by the different semantic 
factors that act on that context might overcome the information provided by the 
arrangement of the two NPs in the last clause, and the person providing linguistic 
judgements will say that it is possible to understand the sentence with coreference 
in that particular situation, i.e., that the sentence (with the interpretation invol- 
ving coreference) is at least partially acceptable. 
4.2. The Interaction of Diferent Semantic Factors 
We could try to account for the data we have considered in section 2 in the follo- 
wing way: instead of trying to provide some principles that forbid certain sort of 
relation (be it co-indexation [as in Standard Binding Theory], sameness of sense or 
codetermination [as in Heim(1993)], common reference [as in Higginbotham 
(1992)], or referential dependency [as in Evans(1980)l) when certain structural 
relation among NPs obtains, I think we could rather look at the disjointness condi- 
tions as describing what information certain structural relations among NPs intro- 
duce. That is, instead of looking at it from the restrictive side (what can not be the 
case and will be ruled out), we could look at it from the side of what it is contri- 
buted (what information is introduced by certain structural relations). This allows 
us to see the disjointness conditions as part of a more general picture: that of the 
different semantic factors that give information about the interpretation of the NPs 
in a sentence. Then, I content, we have a better and more natural way of explaining 
the grammaticality judgements of the speakers about some of the problematic 
sentences: When interpreting the NPs in a sentence we have, on the one hand, the 
information provided by (B)' and (C)' (on the basis of the structural relations 
among the NPs); on the other hand, we have the information provided by other 
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aspects of the sentence or the discourse, and by the context. These two sources of 
information usually concur, but sometimes they might be in conflict. If they are in 
conflict and if the second sort of information is strong and unequivocal enough it 
rnight overcome the information provided by the Disjointness Conditions. Then the 
speakers will judge that the interpretation of the sentence induced by the second 
source of information is possible. Nevertheless, and because of the conflict with the 
Disjointness Conditions, the sentence will be judged as somewhat awkward or 
only partially acceptable. 
Sentence (9) exemplifies this point. Consider (9) (which is the same as (4a)): 
(9) Mary, Betty and John have one thing in common: Mary admires John, 
Betty admires him, and John himself also admires him. [3.8] 
The structural arrangement of John himself and him in the last clause carries the 
information that we cannot understand John himself and him so that it will be 
presupposed that they are the same individual; on the other hand, other factors force 
that we realize that the individual the two NPs will refer to is the same. The final 
result is that we can understand the sentence with the coreferential interpretation 
of John himselfand him. Because of the conflict between the information that 
different aspects of the sentence convey, though, the sentence has a somewhat odd 
character (its mean grade is [3.8]). The factors that force that both John himself 
and him are taken to refer to John are: John himselfrefers naturally to John -the 
same person named John that has been referred to in the previous clauses-; this 
is reinforced by the fact that we are expecting to be told what Mary, Betty and John 
have in common, and in the previous two clauses the subject NP refers to, respec- 
tively, Mary and Betty, and so we expect the subject NP in the last clause to 
refer to John; in addition the use of himself also forces John himself to refer 
to the same male named John that the previous clauses refer to, since the use of 
himself carries the presupposition that the person in question has already been 
mentioned. The use of also in the last clause introduces the presupposition that a 
property that is being attributed in the last clause has already been considered 
(the last clause can be seen as involving the attribution of either one of two 
properties: that of 'admiring him', and that of 'being admired by John'); the 
repetition in the previous clauses of the attribution of the property of admiring John, 
makes that property completely salient in order to be the property that also carries 
the presupposition about (as opposed to the property of being admired by John); 
now, if also in the last clause introduces the presupposition that the last clause is 
attributing the property of admiring John, that means that him in the VP of the last 
clause should refer to John. Finally, the fact that it has been announced at the 
beginning that we would be told what Mary, Betty and John have in common, and 
that we have already been told that what Mary and Betty both do is to admire John, 
makes us to expect that in the last clause we will be told two things: first (as we 
already mentioned above) what John does, and, second, that what he does is the 
same that Mary and Betty do: to admire John. That means, again, that both John 
and him will have to refer to John. All these factors force us to interpret the 
sentence so that we realize that both John himselfand him refer to the same indi- 
vidual. That is, all these factors together counteract the information conveyed by 
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the Disjointness Conditions on the basis of the structural relation between the 
two NPs. 
Notice that if the sentence were (10) 
(10) Susan admires John, and he admires him. 
the sentence would be quite acceptable but the last clause would not be understood 
so that the two NPs refer both to John but rather it would probably be taken to mean 
that John admires some man or boy who, it would be assumed, the speaker is trea- 
ting as having already been introduced in the conversation. If asked whether the last 
part of (10) can mean that John admires himself, the subject offering her linguistic 
judgements would have to say that, if nothing else is added, it cannot. If forced to 
give a grade to the sentence 'when there is coreference' it would be a very low grade 
((10) -with the addition of italics to indicate intended coreference- obtained a 
mean grade below 1). 
When a speaker is asked to evaluate a sentence like the last clause of (10) 
(with no particular context) coreference is deemed unacceptable (since the only 
factor that gives information about the relation between the two NPs is the struc- 
tural arrangement of the two NPs, and the information that this arrangement gives 
is that they cannot be taken to corefer); but if a discourse or context is added 
which provides additional information about who the two NPs refer to, the speaker 
might judge that coreference is possible, and so that a co-referential reading of 
the sentence is, at least, marginally acceptable. Something similar was the case 
with respect to she and the possibility of referring to a male. 
Notice that from the account of the (partial) acceptability of (9) that the have 
provided, it trivially follows an explanation of why if we modify (9) so as to 
suppress some of the features that we have said help the sentence to be regarded as 
good the sentence becomes less good. For instance if we omit himselfor also as in 
(1 la) the sentence becomes less good; it becomes even worse if, in addition, we do 
not mention one of the women as in (1 1b).15 Also, if we omit to announce that we 
are going to tell what it is that the three people have in common, as in (1 lc), the 
sentence is certainly worse than (9). 
(1 1) a. Mary, Betty and John have one thing in common: Mary admires John, 
Betty admires him, and John admires him. 
b. Mary and John have one thing in comrnon: Mary admires John, and John 
admires him. 
c. Mary admires John, Betty admires him, and John hirnself also admxes him. 
u.21 
15. Unfortunately, the linguistic judgements questionnaire I use did not include the totality of the 
sentences we will use in our discussion. In particular, it did not include sentences (1 la) and (1 lb). 
I will have to hope that the intuitions of the reader with respect to these two sentences coincide with 
my own -which are the ones expressed in the text. 
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We will further develop the idea introduced in this section in section 6 ,  where 
we will comment on some of the other sentences in (3)-(5) that are regarded as 
acceptable for the same reasons as (9) is. 
5. Identity and the Disjointness Conditions 
In this section we will focus on those sentences analogous to those in (3)-(4) that 
are completely good ((3a), (3f) and (4b)). We will see that their interpretation 
does not involve any conflict with the Disjointness Conditions. 
5.1. Non-presupposed identity 
Under our formulation of the disjointness conditions it is easy to explain why the 
last part of (4b) and of (30 are completely acceptable sentences and, unlike some 
of the other sentences in (3), (4) and (5 ) ,  they do not have any flavour of oddness 
or of being only partially good. Consider, for instance, (4b) (repeated here as 
(12)): 
(12) At a Halloween party someone says: I think that the rnan with the devil 
costume is Joe. It is suspicious that he knows hirn so well. 
The reason why it is completely good even if he and hirn in the last clause actually 
refer both to Joe is this: when uttering the last part of (12) it is still an open ques- 
tion whether the rnan in the devil costume (who is the one he refers to) is or is not 
Joe (who is the one hirn refers to). Whether they are the same or not is precisely what 
is being discussed. Putting it in terms of possible worlds: in some worlds in the 
context, Joe is the rnan that is wearing the devil costume at the Halloween party, 
but in some other worlds in the context someone other than Joe is the one who is 
wearing the devil costume. That means that we interpret he and hirn so that they refer 
to the same individual in those worlds in the context where Joe is the one wearing 
the devil costume, but they refer to different individuals in those worlds where 
someone else is wearing the costume. So, we interpret the two NPs so that it is not 
presupposed that they refer to the same individual (and so it is not presupposed that 
they are co-valued). There is no problem, then, in interpreting the last part of (12) 
in accordance to (B)'. 
We could not interpret <<He knows him very welln in (12) with He referring to 
whoever is the rnan in the devil costume, and hirn referring to Joe if it were not an 
open question whether the two individuals are the same or not. We can see this in 
(13), where the previous discourse has been modified so as to try to make clear that 
when the utterance of the last clause takes place it is presupposed that Joe is the rnan 
with the devil costume. 
(13) A: Do you have the list of who is each person in the party? 
B: Yes. 
A: Could you tell me who is the rnan with the devil costume? 
B: The rnan with the devil costume is Joe 
A: Oh, I see. It is suspicious that he knows hirn so well. 
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We cannot understand the last clause so that he and him both refer to that indi- 
vidual that we have already established that is both Joe and the man with the devil 
costume.16 
5.2. Identity Sentences 
Regarding sentences with a so called equative use of the copula like for instance 
the last part of (14) (which is the same as (3a)) 
(14) Who is that woman over there? She is professor Rigau. 
one might think that the explanation for why they are completely good sentences 
is the same that we just gave for (12). However this is not really the case. 
5.2.1. A Problem. It is true that usually when we utter a sentence such as the last 
clause of (14) we are not presupposing that the two NPs refer to the same indivi- 
dual. Nevertheless it still might be perfectly fine to utter an identity sentence in a 
situation where according to what the participants assume, the two NPs will refer 
to same individual. For instance, if Diana, Pilar and Colin are in a room and they 
all know each other (and know that they know each other, etc), Diana's utterance 
of (15) is still good: 
(15) He is Colin. 
It might be a silly and pointless utterance, but it is still perfectly good from a 
grammatical point of view. 
5.2.2. Heim's Reply. One reply given to this objection by severa1 authors (in Heim 
(1988,1993), Lasnik (1990), and in some way also in Higginbotham (1992)) 
16. We can make the sentence good, or at least much better, by changing the tense of rhe discourse to 
past, and by replacing ((It's suspicious thab in the last clause by an expression such as eThis is w h y ~ ,  
c<This explains thatn or ((No wonder then thatn. I do not think this poses a problem for the claim 
that what makes the last part of (8) good is that we are not presupposing that the individuals that 
he and him refer to are the same. The use of past tense and of expressions like (~This is the reason 
why ... )) facilitates interpreting the sentence with respect to the context as it was before the previous 
sentence had been uttered. We can also see this in a text like (i): 
(i) A: I wonder why Tom did not come to the party with his wife. 
B: Tom has never been married 
A: This explains why he did not come with his wife. 
The use of his wife in the last clause requires that it is not presupposed that Tom is not 
married. This, though, is exactly the information that has been introduced in the context by B. 
Nevertheless, the use of athis explains w h y ~  makes easier to understand that what follows does not 
take for granted the information that this (in dhis explains w h y ~ )  refers to. 
More could be said about how expressions iiie &is is the reason why ... > affect what the parti- 
cipants will be able to understand is the context they should use to evaluate a particular utterance. 
Examining this any further, though, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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consists in claiming that by the very act of uttering a sentence that asserts certain 
identity the speaker indicates that we are not presupposing that identity (and so that 
the hearers should assume that the identity was not presupposed, even if they 
thought it was).17 If the context is assumed to have been such that it was not 
presupposed that the two individuals were the same, then the identity sentence is 
not in conflict with our disjointness conditions. 
The reason why the speaker indicates we are not presupposing the identity 
when uttering the identity sentence is that it is a general principle governing 
conversation that what it is asserted cannot be presupposed. This principle follows 
from Grice's Cooperative Principle, and, in particular, from the maxim of 
  el atio n. l8 
5.2.3. Objection-1 to Heim's Reply. I do not think we should be satisfied with this 
explanation of why identity statements are perfectly good sentences even when the 
identity is already presupposed. One way of realizing that this explanation cannot 
be satisfactory is by noticing the following: The principle that what is said can 
not be presupposed is just a principle about rational interchange of information. As 
with any other principle derived from the Cooperative Principle, it is possible, at 
the price of acting silly, not to act in accordance with the principle. I can say to you 
<<This man is Higginbothaml,, and you might reply ccYes certainly, he is 
Higginbothamn, and I might go on to say <<He is Higginbotham. He is 
Higginbotham>>. My utterance would be silly, but completely acceptable from a 
gramatical point of view. The reason why we feel that my utterance would be silly 
is that it would violate the maxim of Relation ('Be relevant'). So, if in the situation 
described we would realize that the maxim of Relation is not operating, we should 
not expect the principle ccwhat is said can not be presupposed>> (that gets its justi- 
fication from that maxim) to apply either. Nevertheless, the sentence is good. So, 
it is not the operation of the principle ccwhat is said can not be presupposed), that 
explains why in the situation described the last utterance of <<He is Higginbothamn 
is still completely correct. 
5.2.4. Objection-2 to Heim's Reply. The reasoning just given shows that it cannot 
be that the explanation for why identity sentences are correct in contexts were the 
identity is already presupposed makes essential use of the maxim of Relation, 
because there are contexts where the maxim of Relation is violated but where an 
identity sentence stating some identity that is already presupposed is still acceptable. 
Now, a more direct way of objecting to what we have termed Heim's Reply is to 
indicate where exactly there is a problem in the argumentation given as part of 
the reply. In order to do so, it will help to make more explicit what the argument 
that appeals to the principle 'what is said can not be presupposed' and that I arn 
objecting to is. 
17. This process of reacting to an utterance of the speaker by regarding the context as having been diffe- 
rent from what it actually was is what David Lewis calls accommodation. See Lewis (1979). 
18. See essay 2 in Grice (1989). 
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The argument can be formulated in the following way: Let NP1 and NP2 be two 
referential noun phrases, and C a context where 'NP1 is NP2' is uttered and where 
the referents of NPI and of NP2 are presupposed to be the same; let 'val(X,w)' 
denote the individual that the referential expression X picks up in the world w, then, 
by assumption, we have (I) and (11): 
(I) 'NP1 is NP2' is uttered in C 
(11) NP1, NP2 and C are such that: VWE C (val(NP1,w) = val(NP2,w)) 
Given (11) we have that what 'NP1 is NP2' says is true in each world in C, and so 
that (111) holds: l9 
(111) What 'NP1 is NP2' (when uttered in C) says is already presupposed 
in C. 
By Grice's Cooperation Principle and, in particular, by the maxim of Relation, we 
have (IV): 
(IV) When the speaker utters 'NP1 is NP2' in C, she is not saying something 
that is already presupposed in C. 
So, there is a conflict between (I), (111) and (IV). It is a general fact that conflicts 
involving the Cooperation Principle can be solved by accommodating (i.e., by 
assuming that the context was different from what it actually was). In the present 
situation the conflict is resolved by assuming (V): 
(V) The context where 'NP1 is NP2' was uttered was not C, but rather a 
context C' which is such that 3 w ~  Ct(val(NPl,w) # val(NP2,w)) 
Finally, given (V) we have (VI): 
(VI) The context where 'NP1 is NP2' is taken to have been uttered is such that 
there is no conflict between the Disjointness Conditions and the inter- 
pretation of the utterance in that context. 
Now that we have the argument laid out in detail we can see that there is a problem 
in (111). (111) assumes that the sentence 'NP1 is NP2' has an interpretation before 
the conclusion (VI) which establishes that the sentence is not in a conflict with the 
Disjointness Conditions has been reached. Premise (111) could be analyzed into 
two sub-premises (for concreteness we assume that what a sentence says is a 
proposition, that a proposition is a set a possible worlds, and that identity statements 
express the diagonal proposition in the sense of Stalnaker (1979) -these assump- 
tions are not at all essential to the point I want to make, t h ~ u ~ h ) : ~ ~  
19. Recall that a context C presupposes that p if for each w 'C, p is true in w. 
20. We could take (IIIa) and (IIIb) simply to be 
(111) a. 'NP1 is NP2' when uttered in C says that p. 
b. C presupposes that p. 
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(111) a. An utterance of 'NP1 is NP2' in C expresses the proposition: 
( WE C:val(NPl ,w) = val(NP2,w)J 
b. C presupposes the proposition {WE C:val(NPl,w) = val(NP2,w)j 
(since from (11) it follows that C = (WE C:val(NPl,w) = val(NP2,w)), 
and so, in particular, C is included in {w~C:va l (NPl ,w)  = 
val(NP2,w)J). 
(IIIa) is completely unjustified, unless we regard the problem we are trying 
to solve as already solved -that is, unless we assume that there is no problem in 
establishing that, given certain context, the identity sentence has certain interpre- 
tation even though the Disjointness Conditions prescribe that the sentence does not 
have that interpretation given that context. (Notice, incidently, that disjointness 
conditions are not taken at all into consideration in the argument (I)-(V) that esta- 
blishes conclusion (VI)). 
In particular, under the assumptions accepted by Heim (where the disjoint- 
ness conditions are syntactic constrains ruling out certain syntactic structures) 
(IIIa) is certainly not true. Any syntactic representation of 'NP1 is NP2' that would 
give rise in C to the interpretation that (IIIa) attributes to the sentence would 
already be ruled out at the syntactic level by the Principles (B) or (C) of the 
Binding  heo or^,^' and so would not express any proposition. 
5.2.5. Another Reply. Maybe behind what I called Heim's reply lurks another argu- 
ment that does not appeal to the principle 'what is asserted can not be presup- 
posed'. It is the following: Suppose that a context C is such that a use of the 
pronoun he would naturally pick up Collin in each world in C, and so would a 
use of the NP Collin. If someone utters He is Collin in C, what would be the 
natural way of interpreting the two NPs conflicts with what the Disjointness 
Conditions prescribe. The hearers, assuming that the speaker is rational and is 
trying to abide by the Cooperative Principle, will try to find a way of escaping 
the conclusion that the speaker's utterance is not interpretable. There is one way of 
doing so: to accommodate, that is, to assume that the context was not C but rather 
C', where C' is such that for some world in C' the two NPs pick up different indi- 
viduals. So the hearers will accommodate, and if accommodation takes place then 
there is no problem in interpreting the sentence in accordance with the disjointness 
conditions. So, the fact that accommodation will take place explains that an utte- 
rance of He is Colin is grammatical even if uttered in a context where the identity 
was already presupposed. 
I think, though, that this argumentation is not satisfactory. If the reasoning in 
the previous paragraph were correct then accommodation should also be an option 
when trying to interpret other sentences that also involve a conflict with the disjoint- 
ness conditions. Consider the contrast between (16) and (17): 
(16) This woman is Pilar. She is Pilar. 
21. Heim (1993) focuses her discussion only on phenomena related to principle (B). What she says, 
though, is easily and naturally extendable to phenomena related to principle (C) as well. 
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(17) This woman is Pilar. She knows Pilar. 
(17) is quite bad (if She is taken to refer to Pilar), whereas (16) is fully accep- 
table. If accornrnodation is possible when interpreting the second clause of (16), then 
it should also be possible when interpreting the second clause of (17); and if the fact 
that accornmodation is possible is what explains that (16) is good then (17) should 
be predicted to be also perfectly good; but (17) is not good. 
Similarly, we cannot explain why identity sentences of the same form as (15) 
are completely good by appealing to an explanation like the one we gave in section 
4 to account for the acceptability of sentences like (4a) or ( 4 ~ ) . ~ ~  Sentences like (4a) 
or (4c) are only partially acceptable. As pointed out in section 4.2, it is precisely the 
fact that the interpretation of these sentences is in conflict with what the Disjointness 
Conditions prescribe that explains why they are only partially acceptable. Identity 
sentences even when uttered in contexts as the one described for (15) are perfectly 
good, though. So, it cannot be that the interpretation of identity sentences involves 
a resolution of a conflict similar to the one involved in the interpretation of (4a) or 
(4c). So, the explanation of the complete acceptability of identity sentences can 
not be along the same lines as the one we gave for (4a) or (4c). 
5.2.6. A feasible solution. I think that a promising way of trying to account for 
the complete grammaticality of identity sentences is in terms of the special syntactic 
character of sentences containing the verb to be. Severa1 works have pointed out 
and tried to explain the special syntactic properties of the so called copular 
senten ce^.^^ In particular Heggie (1988) argues that the predicate of copular 
sentences is not the verb to be, but rather one of the N P S . ~ ~  That means that there 
is only one argument in identity sentences: the NP that is not the predicate.25 If we 
assume that the Disjointness Conditions apply only to arguments, then the 
Disjointness Conditions do not provide any information about how copular sentences 
22. Recall that the explanation was that the interpretation of the sentence involves a conflict between 
the Disjointness Conditions and other kinds of information. In sentences like (4a) and (4c) the 
infonnation opposing the Disjointness Conditions is strong enough as to prevail and make the 
sentence interpretable. 
23 See, for instance, Longobardi (1985), Rappaport (1987), Heggie (1988) and Moro (1991). 
24 According to Heggie, this claim requires some qualifications. 
25. Argument andpredicate are technical notions in linguistic theory. They are usually characterized 
in terms of the so called Theta-theory. One alternative way of characterizing the notions of argu- 
ment andpredicate is in terms of the type of semantic values they can have. We will not commit 
ourselves here to any particular characterization of the two notions. Among many other altemative 
ways, one of the simplest characterizations would be the following: 
We define a predicate of degree-n inductively as follows: A predicate of degree-1 is an 
expression whose semantic value is a function from the set of individuals to the set of truth values; 
a predicate of degree-n+l is an expression whose semantic value is a function from the set of 
individuals to the set of predicates of degree-n. X is apredicate if, for some n, X is a predicate of 
degree-n. X is an argument, if X can be functionally combined with a predicate of degree-1 to yield 
a truth value. (Notice that under this definition not only expressions whose semantic value is an indi- 
vidual can be arguments; if the semantic value of a quantificational expression is a function from 
predicates of degree-1 to truth values, then quantificational expressions are also arguments). 
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like (15) should be interpreted. The interpretation of identity sentences does not, 
then, involve any conflict with the Disjointness Conditions. 
Discussing the different arguments that show the special character of copular 
sentences and that try to prove that the predicate of copular sentences is one of the 
NPs, as well as examining the possible evidence against this view is by itself a 
lengthy topic. The reader is referred to the discussion in Heggie (1988) and the other 
works mentioned in footnote 23. Here we will restrict ourselves to mentioning 
one kind of data that gives plausibility to the view, without entering in any further 
details. 
In Catalan the clitic el (L') corresponds to an argument position; the clitic ho can 
correspond to predicates but cannot correspond to any personal NP in an argument 
position. This is illustrated in (18). In (18b) the clitic el stands for the argument el 
Joan in (18a), while it is not possible for ho to stand for that argument:26 
(18) a. Aquell home estima el Joan. 
that man loves (the) John 
b. Aquell home l'/*ho estima. 
that man himlit loves 
In (19b) the clitic ho stands for the predicate molt felig 'very happy' in (19a), 
whereas el can not stand for that predicate 
(19) a. El Joan és molt feliq. 
(the) John is very happy 
b. El Joan ho/*ll és. 
(the) John ithim is 
In contrast with (18a-b), the argument clitic el in (20b) can not be made to 
stand for the NP el Joan in the identity sentence (20a), but the predicate clitic ho 
can:27 
(20) a. Aquest home és el Joan. 
this man is (the) John 
b. Aquest home *l'/ho és. 
this man h id i t  is 
26. Heggie(1987) and Longobardi(l985) describe similar facts to (18)-(20) for French and Italian, 
respectively. 
27. According to Fabra (1956), the standard normative text for the Catalan language, the judgements 
for (20b) should rather be 
(i). Aquest home lt/*ho és. 
I have collected the linguistic judgements for these sentences from six Catalan speakers. None agrees 
with what Fabra (1956) prescribes; five of tbem agree with the data as I presented above; one of 
them -maybe under the normative influence of Fabra (1956)- judges that the NP in (20a) can 
pronominalize as el or ho. 
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The data (18)-(20) suggest that the NP el Joan in (20a) is not an argument but 
a predicate. If the Disjointness Conditions apply only to argument NPs, then the 
Disjointness Conditions are irrelevant for the interpretation of (20a). In particular, 
there would be no conflict with the Disjointness Conditions if we interpreted the 
two NPs in (20a) in such a way that they determine the same individual in each 
world in the context.28 
6. Some comments 
6.1. The Disjointness Conditions and the Cooperative Principle 
That our Disjointness Conditions (B)' and (C)' be concerned with what it is presup- 
posed to be the case, rather than what is actually the case is what allows our 
proposa1 to dea1 with examples like (12). It could seem, though, that this very 
same feature gives rise to wrong predictions regarding the use of sentences like (21) 
in certain contexts. 
(21) He loves him. 
Usually when someone utters (21) the context will contain information about who 
each NP refers to (say, we are talking about John's feelings for Paul, or we are 
talking about who loves Clinton and at that point Henry comes into the room, 
etc). If this contextual information implies that He and him refer to different indi- 
viduals (and so that, for each world in the context, the individual that He picks up 
is distinct from the individual that him picks up), then we will interpret the sentence 
with the two NPs referring to two different individuals. This is in agreement with 
what the Disjointness Conditions prescribe (the Disjointness Conditions prescribe 
that it not be presupposed that the NPs refer to the same individual, and the contex- 
tual information agrees with that since this information will determine that the 
individuals that the two NPs refer to are presupposed not to be the ~ a m e ) . ~ ~  
If we hear someone utter (21) and we have to interpret it without being able to 
use any previous context (say we have just joined an ongoing conversation), 
though, we will also think that the individuals referred to by He and him are 
distinct, not just that it is not presupposed that they are the same. This rnight seem 
to be a problem for the formulation of the disjointness conditions that I am defen- 
ding for the following reason: 
If (21) is uttered in a context that contains no information about who the 
referent of the two NPs is, then it seems that the hearers, in order to interpret the 
NPs, will have to rely solely on the lexical information and the information 
28. I use the word <<detennine)> in an ambiguous way. The two NPs will 'determine' the individual in 
a different way, since, presumably, they will have a different type of semantic value. If the 
semantic value of the argument NP Aquest home 'this man' is an individual, then the semantic value 
of the predicate NP el Joan 'John' might, for instance, be a set of individuals -actually, a singleton 
set, which also determines an individual. 
29. Compare: (I) Not to presuppose that p; (II) to presuppose that not-p. (I) does not imply (11), though 
(11) implies (I) (assuming consistency), so to satisfy (11) is one way of satisfying (I). 
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provided by the Disjointness Conditions. The lexical information is just that the indi- 
viduals the NPs refer to are male and are not the speaker or the hearers though they 
are somewhat salient at that point in the conversation. The information provided 
by the Disjointness conditions is that either (I) it is an open question whether the 
two NPs refer to the same individual &e.. in some worlds in the context thev \ .  
pick up the same individual, but in some other worlds they do not), or (11) the 
two NPs refer to two different individuals (i.e., in each world in the context they 
pick up different individuals). The Disjointness Conditions do not determine 
which of (I) or (111) is the case. 
So, using solely the Disjointness Conditions (and the lexical information) we 
could not conclude (11). But, as pointed out above, (11) is what we do conclude when 
we hear (21) in a context that does not provide any information about the reference 
of the NPs. This seems to suggest that there is a problem for my formulation of the 
disjointness conditions and that they should be amended. If what we conclude 
when we hear (21) in a context that does not provide information on the reference 
of the NPs is that they refer to different individuals, and it seems that all the infor- 
mation we can use in such a context is provided by the disjointness conditions 
(and lexical semantics), then it seems that what the disjointness conditions should 
prescribe is that (when the relevant syntactic relation obtains) the interpretation of 
the two NPs must be presupposed to be distinct, not just not presupposed to be the 
same. (Adopting this modification would, of course, be problematic in other 
respects since, for instance, we would no longer be able to account for sentences 
like (12)). 
I think, though, that the suggested objection above overlooks one kind of infor- 
mation that will be available to the hearers when (21) is uttered even if the context 
does not include any information about who the NPs refer to: that the speaker is 
conforming to Grice's Cooperative Principle. Barring information to the contrary, 
we will always assume that the Cooperative Principle and in particular, the Gricean 
maxims, are respected. And we will rely on this assumption when trying to inter- 
pret what the speaker says. 
If we hear (21) in a context that does not contain information about who the 
referent of the two pronouns is, but that, otherwise, is a non-special context, we 
will assume that the speaker knows who she is talking about. So she knows who 
the person that she is referring to by He is, and who the person that she is referring 
to by him is, and so she knows whether they are the same or not. If she knew 
she was talking about one single person, then she would not talk as if the question 
whether there is one person or two was open, since doing so would go against the 
maxim of Quantity ('be as informative as is required'). So, since she is treating 
the question as open, we can conclude that she is not talking about one single 
verson but two. 
Of course there can be special contexts (as, for instance, in (12)) in which it is 
clear that the speaker is unsure about the identity of the individuals she is talking 
about, or where she has some good reason to act as if she is unsure. This is not, 
though, what is usually the case. Barring information to the contrary, we will 
assume that the conversation does not take place in any of these special contexts, 
and so we will assume that the speaker knows who she is talking about, and that 
she is open about it. So, assuming Disjointness Condition (B)' and the Gricean 
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maxims, it follows, as desired, that in non-special contexts the hearers will assume 
that when the speaker utters (21) she is talking about two individuals. 
Notice that in a special context where it is reasonable to believe that Gricean 
maxims do not apply, like, for instance, when an oracle says something, or in 
the statement of some puzzle in, say, the Sunday edition of a newspaper, we 
would not conclude from the use of (21.) that the individual referred to by He is 
not the individual referred to by him, but rather only that it might or it might not 
be the same. 
6.2. Sources of information for the interpretation of NPs 
As we have pointed out, there are severa1 sources of information that are used in 
interpreting the NPs in a sentence, besides the information provided by the 
Disjointness Conditions on the basis of the structural relation among the NPs. In 
this subsection we will exarnine some of the ways of generating the information that, 
as we have seen, in sentences like the ones in (3)-(5) can conflict with and prevail 
over the information provided by the Disjointness Conditions. 
6.2.1. Presuppositions. The most common way of generating such information is 
by making it clear that the clause in which certain NP X appears expresses some 
property which is the same as certain property that has been introduced before. The 
property involves certain individual or certain pattern of linking. So X must refer 
to that individual or be subject to that particular pattern of linking. One way of 
having this effect is by repeating severa1 times the attribution of a property, so as 
to create a pattern that will make the listener expect that the next attribution of a 
property will fit the same pattern (this is illustrated, for instance, in (3c)). Another 
way of having this effect is by having mentioned the application of the property 
as a general case and then making clear that we are considering a particular appli- 
cation of that general case (this is illustrated in (3e) and (5a)). One specially 
good way of having this effect, though, is by using some device which intro- 
duces a presupposition. We have already cornmented (with respect to (3c)) on the 
effect that the presence of also can have. The word even (that appears in (3b)) has 
a similar effect to that of also. The sentences in (3)-(5) illustrate, though, other 
ways of introducing presuppositions besides including some specific word. 
Consider, for instance, (22): 
(22) What do you mean no one loves Oscar? He loves him. P.51 
He clearly refers to Oscar, which is the only salient individual when the pronoun 
is uttered. In a more common discourse hirn would be taken as referring to some 
other individual different from Oscar (because of Disjointness Condition (B)' and 
the Cooperation Principle). But a sequence of the form What do you mean a ?  P 
carries the presupposition that P implies no-a. In the case of (22) this means that 
He loves hirn implies that it is not the case that no one loves Oscar. The most 
simple and likely way for He loves hirn to have that implication is if He loves hirn 
itself is an attribution of the property of loving Oscar. If this is so, then hirn must 
refer to Oscar, Disjointness Condition (B)' notwithstanding. 
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Another way of introducing presuppositions is by stressing some word. 
Whatever exactly the presupposition induced by stressing an NP is, it includes 
that the property being attributed to the individual determined by the NP, has 
already been considered. So in (23) 
(23) What do you mean John loves no one? He loves JOHN. í5.71 
the stress on John carries the presupposition that the property of being loved 
by the subject of the last clause has already being considered. There are two 
properties that have been considered in the first clause: the property of being 
loved by John and the property of loving no one. The latter, though, cannot be the 
one that the stressing of John carries the presupposition about since in the last 
clause -even before determining who the NPs refer to- it is clear that we are 
not attributing the property of loving no one. So the presupposition brought about 
by stressing John, is that, in the last clause, we are attributing the property of 
being loved by John; that means that He must refer to John, Disjointness Condition 
(C)' notwithstanding. There is also, of course, the presupposition brought about 
by the structure What do you mean a? P which adds its effect to the stressing of 
John. 
6.2.2. Demonstration. Another way of generating information that can override 
the information provided by the Disjointness Conditions is by using an N P  demons- 
tratively. (24a,b) illustrate this: 
(24) a. He refuted HIM [points to the person] 
b. A: John saw Peter. 
B: No, John saw HIM [points to John] 
In, for instance, (24a) He refers to whoever is most salient individual at that point 
in the conversation; because of Disjointness Condition (B)', without demonstration 
him would be assumed not to refer to the same individual; the demonstration, 
though, forces it to refer to that same individual. 
Using an NP demonstratively is a very clear way of indicating what the NP 
refers to; this is why the intended reference can be communicated even if the 
Disjointness Conditions are providing opposing information. Notice that most of 
the sentences considered in the previous subsection involved severa1 devices that 
together were able to quite successfully override (B)' or (C)'. (24a) shows that 
pointing is effective enough as to have that effect on its own. Still the combination 
of demonstration with other devices, as in (24b), makes the overruling of (B)' 
clearer and the sentence better. 
6.2.3. Pronominals versus Referential Expressions. A pronoun is very strongly 
dependent on the context to determine what it refers to. This is not so for proper 
names and definite descriptions. They are to an extend dependent on the context 
(there are many people named John and many presidents), but not as much as 
pronouns are. Proper narnes and definite descriptions are able, to a good extend, to 
determine their referent 'on their own'. 
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It is usually said that 'Principle (C) violations' are less strong than 'Principle 
(B) violations'. Under my proposal we can explain what motivates this claim 
without having to accept the queer idea that there is a different degree of pres- 
criptiveness associated to each of the Disjointness ~ o n d i t i o n s . ~ ~  
Notice that the claim does not seem to be true of sentences violating (C) that 
include a pronoun but do not contain any indication at al1 about who the referent 
of the pronoun is. So, for instance, 1 think that without any particular previous 
context, it is as hard and unlikely to understand that the NPs in (25b,c) (principle 
(C) configurations) refer to the same individual as it is in (25a) (a pnnciple (B) confi- 
guration): 
(25) a. He admires him. 
b. He thinks that Paul is crazy. 
c. He admires Paul. 
1 think that what motivates the claim that 'violations of (C) are not as bad as 
violations of (B)' are contrasts like (26a-b): 
(26) a. 1 talked to Paul today. He admires him. 
b. 1 talked to Paul today. He admires Paul. 
It seems that correference in the last clause of (26b), even if it is still quite bad, is 
not as bad as in the last clause of (26a). 1 think we can explain why in the following 
way: both in (26a) and (26b) the pronoun He would naturally tend to pick up Paul 
as its referent. In (26a), nothing indicates what the referent of him ought to be; 
Disjointness Condition (B)' indicates that it can NOT be assumed to the same 
individual He refers to; so, because of the effect of (B)', him can not be understood 
as also referring to Paul. In the second clause of (26b), unlike what is the case 
with respect to him in (26a), Paul would naturally tend by itself to refer to the 
Paul that is mentioned in the first clause; because of the effect of (C)', though, 
the most likely way of taking an utterance of (26b) (without any other relevant 
context), would probably be as Paul in the second clause referring to a person 
named Paul distinct from the Paul mentioned in the first sentence. In any case, even 
if the presence of a proper name, which by itself gives clear indication of what its 
most likely referent is, is not sufficient to neutralize and prevail over the effect of 
(C)', it is enough to diminish it. This makes it easier to understand the last part of 
(26b) as involving coreference than to understand the last part of (26a) as involving 
coreference; this, in turn, is what makes us feel that a coreferential interpretation 
in (26b) is not as bad as in (26a). 
30. As we see in the next paragraph, the proponent of a different force associated with each disjoint- 
ness condition would also have the problem of explaining why some kinds of sentences violating 
(C) are as bad as their analogues which violate (B). 
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6.3. Corroborating Data 
The grade that was given to (the correference reading of) the sentences in (27) is 
exactly what should be expected if the proposa1 under consideration and the obser- 
vations in the previous sections are ~ o r r e c t : ~ ~  
(27) a. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? He loves Oscar. [2.91 
b. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? HE loves Oscar. i4.21 
c. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? He loves him. P.51 
d. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? HE loves him. i3.61 
Sentence (27a) is better than (27c), and (27b) better than (27d), in accordance to the 
fact that proper names can determine its referent with much less dependence from 
the context than a pronoun (and so are less affected by the opposing effect of (B)' 
or (C)'); (27b) is better than (27a) and (27d) better than (27c), as should be expected 
if stress introduces the presupposition that the property attributed to the subject of 
the second clause is a property that has already been considered in the previous 
clause, and if this presupposition helps to make clearer what the referent of the last 
NP is, and this, in turn, makes a difference on how acceptable the sentence is. 
Finally, the sentences in (27) seem to suggest that those devices that can make 
correference in a sentence more or less acceptable, add to each other: (27d) is 
better than (27c), and (27b) is even better than (27d). ((27d) includes the use 
of the presupposition generating structure What do you mean a? P and the use of 
stress, whereas (27c) does not contain stress; (27b) in addition to the devices in 
(27d), also includes the use of a proper name). 
7. Two-stages in the interpretation of an utterance 
The proposa1 I present in this paper is not yet complete. We have seen that the 
basis for explaining the acceptability of sentences like (3b-e) is the fact that the inter- 
pretation of these sentences involves an interaction between, on the one hand, the 
information provided by the Disjointness Conditions and, on the other hand, other 
information provided by other aspects of the sentence, or by the context. We will 
see in this section that it is necessary to be more specific about what is involved in 
this interaction in order to satisfactorily account for the data. In particular we will 
see that we need to take into consideration the existence of two stages in the inter- 
pretation of a sentence. That something must be missing in the proposa1 as it 
stands is shown by (28): 
(28) I refuted me. [o] 
31. I do not pretend that the results of rny linguistic questionnaire provide a cornpletely reliable 
rneasure of the acceptability of the different sentences. More tests would be needed to support 
the results I obtained. Still, I think it worth mentioning how well the grades obtained by the 
sentences in (27) fit with the proposal I arn defending. 
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It is completely clear that the pronouns I and me in (28) should refer to the same 
person, the speaker. So it would seem that, according to the proposa1 I am defen- 
ding, the effect of Disjointness Condition (B)' in (28) should be overridden by the 
opposing and unequivocal information about the reference of the pronouns that the 
very pronouns provide. And so, (28) should be, at least, partially acceptable. (28), 
though, is completely bad. 
It is clear that the process of interpretation of a word, sentence or piece of 
discourse involves different aspects. For example, part of the interpretation of an 
utterance of the word she will consist in recognizing, for instance, that the word has 
been used referentially and to interpret the word as an expression that will poten- 
tially refer to some human female that is in some way salient at the moment of the 
utterance. This is part of the interpretation of the utterance but it is not all there is 
to interpreting the utterance. Another aspect of the interpretation is to determine 
which specific individual the word refers to (for instance, to determine that it is Delia 
that the speaker refers to by his use of she). 
In order to satisfactorily account for the phenomena related to the Disjointness 
Conditions we must take into consideration the existence in the process of semantic 
interpretation of the two stages suggested in the previous paragraph: in the first stage 
only structural, lexical and general semantic information is used, and a partial 
interpretation is produced. For instance, a partial interpretation of a referential use 
of a pronoun like he would identify it as a referential expression that picks up a male 
human who is in some way salient.32 The partial interpretation for a sentence like 
He loves him would be the pseudo-proposition that a not-yet determined male 
human loves a not-yet determined male human who it is not assumed to be the sarne 
as the first ~ n e . ~ ~  This partial interpretation is produced on the sole basis of the 
lexical information of the words and the semantic mles -including the Disjointness 
Conditions (which depend, in turn, on the structural relationship between the NPs). 
In the second stage the information from other parts of the discourse and from 
the context is brought in and the complete interpretation is produced. For instance, 
32. If we take the full interpretation of a pronoun to be a hyo dimension individual concept, that is, a 
function f that to each world w in the context assigns a function g that assigns an individual to each 
possible world (in the case of a rigid designator g is constant, though f might not be), then a 
partial interpretation of a pronoun is a function h whose arguments are sets of possible worlds 
(contexts) and whose values are individual concepts (h will only be defined for some contexts: those 
where an utterance of the pronoun takes place, and where the language is the one that the iuterpreter 
is considering). 
33. If the full interpretation of a sentence in a context C is apropositional concept, i.e., a function f that 
to each world in C assigns a function g that assigns a truth value to each possible world, then we 
can postulate that the partial interpretation of a sentence like He saw him is a function h that takes 
as an argument a set of possible worlds (a context) and that yields as a value a propositional 
concept. h will only be defined for some contexts: those that are such the utterance of the sentence 
has taken place, where the language is the one the iuterpreter is considering, and which are such 
that: the interpretation of the two NPs with respect to that context (i.e. the individual concept 
that, in accordance to the partial interpretation of each of the NPs, is the value of that NP with respect 
to that context) is such that: the diagonal of the two individual concepts is not the same [this last 
condition is what incorporates the idea that it is part of the partial interpretation of the sentence that 
we do not presuppose that the reference of the two NPs is the same]. 
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in the second stage of the interpretation of an utterance of he, the contextual infor- 
mation that, say, John is a salient human male and the individual that is most rele- 
vant for the topic that is currently discussed is used in order to determine, on the 
basis of the partial interpretation of he produced in the first stage, that the speaker 
referred to John. In the second stage of the interpretation of He loves him, discourse 
and contextual information (like for instance-that the topic under discussion is 
James' feelings for John) is applied to the first stage's partial interpretation in order 
to produce the final interpretation of the sentence (for instance that James loves 
John). 
It might be that the contextual information that is used in the second stage is in 
confiict with some aspect of the partial interpretation produced in the first stage. The 
observations about how the conflict might get resolved made in the previous 
sections apply here: the existence of the conflict might make the sentence to be 
regarded as bad, or, if the opposing contextual and discourse information brought 
in at the second stage is clear and strong enough, the sentence will be interpreted 
in accordance with the contextual and discourse information and will be regarded 
as (at least partially) acceptable. 
What we just said about the possibility of resolving conflicts between the 
product of the first stage and the contextual information brought in at the second 
stage is perfectly compatible with things working differently when the conflict is 
interna1 to the first stage. It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that when 
there is a conflict in what the semantic mles and the lexical infoimation ~rovided 
by the different items prescribe, then no coherent partial interpretation is possible, 
and the sentence is regarded as unacceptable. 
This would explain the complete unacceptability of I refuted me. The lexical 
information associated with I determines that the word refers to the speaker, and 
so does the lexical information associated with me. So, it is part of the partial 
interpretation of the first stage that the two pronouns should be understood as 
referring to the same individual, whichever the actual world turns out to be. On the 
other hand, given the structural relationship between the pronoms, Disjointness 
Condition (B)' prescribes that the referent of the two pronouns can not be assumed 
to be the same. The conflict prevents a coherent representation at the first stage, and 
this makes the sentence unacceptable. 
By referring to the two stages as 'first' and 'second' I am, of course, not clai- 
ming that this is a temporal description of empirical processes. The first stage is 
previous to the second just in the logical sense that the second stage presupposes 
the first, since the partial interpretation which is the product of the first stage is one 
of the elements used in the second stage to provide the final interpretation. It 
might very well be that, when an actual evaluation of a sentence takes place, 
processes corresponding to the second stage take place at the sarne time as processes 
in the first, in the same way in which semantic processes might take place before 
a logically previous process (for instance a syntactic process Gke, say,determining 
which was the first word of the sentence uttered -as when we have not clearly 
heard what was uttered) has been completed. 
Someone might object to my havini regarded the evaluation of presuppositions 
as pertaining to the second stage where contextual information is taking into 
account. It might be claimed that, since presuppositions are introduced by some 
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specific words or forms of sentences, they should be regarded as part of what is 
evaluated at the first stage when the lexical information, the structure of the 
sentence and the semantic rules are taken into account. If presuppositions are 
evaluated at the first stage then, for many of the examples we have considered, the 
conflict between different sources of information would already arise at the first 
stage. So, there would be no justification for my claim that the conflict of infor- 
mation that explains the (partial) acceptability of sentences like (3b-e) is of a diffe- 
rent sort from the conflict of information that makes (28) bad. 
We can see that this objection is not correct by taking into account one of the 
points made by Sau1 Kripke in Kripke (1990): some presuppositions involve an 
anaphoric element, analogous to some uses of pronouns. If someone says <<Pau1 also 
went to the movies>> the sentence involves an anaphoric reference to certain propo- 
sition, like for instance, that Paul went to the library, or that Arthur went to the 
movies. We say that some presuppositions involve an anaphoric element in the follo- 
wing sense: the full interpretation of the sentence carrying the presupposition 
requires the identification of one proposition that has certain characteristics and that 
is in some way salient. The full interpretation of a referential use of the pronoun he 
requires the identification of an individual who is male and that is in some way 
salient (either by having being just mentioned or in some other way). Analogously, 
the full interpretation of an utterance of the sentence <<Pau1 also went to the movies>> 
requires the identification of a proposition with certain characteristics (it has to 
involve the attribution of a property to Paul, or one attribution of the property of 
going to the movies) and which is salient in some way --either by having been 
recently expressed or in some other way (for instance, by the fact that the speakers 
are watching a video where they can see Paul going to the library). In the same way 
in which the determination of the referent of a pronoun is carried out in the second 
stage of the interpretation where contextual information is brought in, it also 
belongs to the second stage the determination of what the particular proposition is 
that is being anaphorically referred to by a sentence carrying a presupposition 
which arises because of the presence of words like also or even, or the stressing of 
some word. Sirnilarly for the presupposition that plays a role in interpreting the W s  
in ,4 in structures like What do you mean a? P, which also depends on identif- 
ying a proposition (the one expressed by a)  that has been previously expressed. 
8. Conclusion 
There are two main ideas we have argued for in this paper. First, the disjointness 
conditions should not be formulated in terms of the relation of actually having 
the same value, but rather, they should take into consideration what the speakers 
believe to be the case. Following Postal (1970) and Heim (1988,1993), we formu- 
late the disjointness conditions in terms of the relation of it being part of what the 
speakers are assuming, or context, that the expressions have the same value. This 
requires using a background semantic theory that enables us to make the desired 
distinctions. Stalnaker (1979) provides one such adequate semantic framework. 
Second, in order to account for the judgements of the speakers regarding the accep- 
tability of different sentences we do not need to provide a set of disjointness condi- 
tions that allows exactly those sentences and interpretations of sentences that the 
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speakers declare as acceptable. Their judgements do not directly reflect their 
(implicit) knowledge of the disjointness conditions. The data seems to be best 
explained if we take into consideration that the disjointness conditions are just 
one among several sources of semantic information that speakers use in trying to 
come up with an interpretation for a sentence. The data supports the idea that a 
sentence will be regarded as at least partially acceptable when understood in a 
way that conflicts with what the disjointness conditions prescribe if the sources of 
semantic information other than the disjointness conditions determine such an 
interpretation in a clear enough way. Viewing things this way enables us not only 
to account for the sentences that have been offered as counter-examples to Standard 
Binding Theory, but also to explain their different degrees of acceptability. 
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